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ARTICLES
THE INCREASING USE OF THE POWER OF CONTEMPT
John L. Hilts*
INTRODUCTION
In a United States district court in Chicago, Illinois, in late 1969 and
early 1970, several defendants were charged with and tried for conspiracy
to organize a riot, and with crossing state lines to incite a riot at the time
of the 1968 Democratic National Convention held in Chicago. The "Chicago
Seven Conspiracy Trial" was the first test of the Federal anti-riot law
which was a rider to the 1968 Civil Rights Act. As a result of the trial,
seven of the defendants were acquited of conspiring to cause a riot, but
five were convicted of crossing state lines to incite a riot.'
During the 100-day trial, Judge Julius Hoffman sentenced summarily,
under Rule 42 (a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, ten men
to a combined total of more than 19 years in prison for contempt of court.2
All of the defendants and their two lawyers were found guilty of criminal
contempt, and were given sentences ranging from 8 months to 4 years.
3
*Member of the Montana Bar, B.A., University of Wyoming, 1967; J. D., Univer-
sity of Montana, 1970.
'The five defendants who were convicted were David Dellinger, Rennard Davis,
Abbot Hoffman, Jerry Rubin, and Thomas Hayden. The two other defendants who
were acquitted of both charges and of a separate charge of teaching the use of an
incendiary device were John Froines and Lee Weiner. An eighth defendant, Bobby
Seale, is scheduled for separate trial on April 23, 1970.
2Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 42, Criminal Contempt, provides:
" (a) Summary Disposition. A criminal contempt may be punished summarily if
the judge certifies that he saw or heard the conduct constituting the ocntempt and
that it was committed in the actual presence of the court. The order of contempt
shall recite the facts and shall be signed by the judge and entered of record.
(b) Disposition upon notice and hearing. A criminal contempt except as provided
in subdivision (a) of this rule shall be prosecuted on notice. The notice shall state
the time and place of hearing, allowing a reasonable time for the preparation of
the defense, and shall state the essential facts constituting the criminal contempt
charged and describe it as such. The notice shall be given orally by the judge in
open court in the presence of the defendant, or, on application of the United States
attorney or of an attorney appointed by the court for that purpose, by an order
to show cause or an order of arrest. The defendant is entitled to a trial by jury
in any case in which an act of Congress so provides. He is entitled to admission
to bail as provided in these rules. If the contempt charged involves disrespect to or
criticism of a judge, that judge is disqualified from presiding at the trial or hear-
ing except with the defendant's consent. Upon a verdict or finding of guilt the
court shall enter an order fixing the punishment."
'The prison sentences were as follows: Seale, four years on 16 counts; Dellinger,
29 months and 16 days on 32 counts; Davis, 25 months and five days on 23 counts;
Hayden, 14 months and 14 days on 11 counts; Hoffman, eight months on 23 counts;
Rubin, 25 months and 23 days on 15 counts; Weiner, two months and 18 days on
seven counts; Froines, six months and 15 days on 10 counts. The lawyers were
sentenced as follows: William Kunstler, 48 months and 13 days on 24 counts; and
Leonard Weinglass, 20 months and five days on 14 counts.
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Judge Hoffman isolated each incident of contempt in separate counts,
and issued sentences not in excess of 6 months for each count.4
This article discusses the use of both civil and criminal contempt
power. However, the major focus is directed to the denial of a right to
jury trial in criminal contempt proceedings.
The origin of the power to punish for contempt of court is generally
traced to England when all the courts were divisions of the Curia Regia,
the supreme court of the English sovereign. It is considered a power
inherent in all courts of record or general jurisdiction in the United
States, whether federal or state.5
Contempt of court is defined as any act which embarrasses, hinders
or obstructs a court in the administration of justice, or which lessens
its authority or dignity.6 Contempts of court are classified as direct or
indirect. Direct contempts are those which are committed within the
immediate view and presence of the court, or so near as to obstruct or
interrupt the administration of justice. 7 An example of direct contempt
is an insult or profanity directed by a lawyer to a judge during a trial.
An indirect or constructive contempt is one committed at a distance from
the court in time or location tending to hinder the administration of
justice.8 An example of indirect contempt is the refusal by a witness to
answer questions before a grand jury when directed by court order to
answer.
Contempts of court are also classified as civil and criminal. Con-
tempt is considered civil if the punishment is wholly remedial and oper-
ates prospectively.9 Civil contempt is used to serve the purposes of the
'Some of the incidents of contempt were these: Abbie Hoffman received seven days
in prison for exposing his stomach to the jury and performing a little dance. Del-
linger received six months for calling the judge "Mister" instead of "Your Honor."
Dellinger also received one day for failing to stand when the judge entered the room,
and five days for standing up in court and yelling "bullshit" when he thought a
police informant was lying. Scale insisted on defending himself, and his accumulated
interruptions resulted in a four year sentence. One of the defendants loudly stated,
"You're a disgrace to the Jews, runtl You should have served Hitler better."
The judge was also called a "racist," a "fascist" and a "pig." Lawyer Kunstler
received four months for persisting in asking a witness, Mayor Richard Daley, ques-
tions after the judge told him they were improper. He was also cited for contempt
for saying that the judge's ruling was "outrageous," and that the defendants were
''going to jail in a legal lynching." Weinglass was given four months for persisting
on one occasion in asking questions when directed by the judge to stop. He also
received citations for defying orders from the bench for "insulting remarks," and
for calling a court ruling ''unfair.''
5Ex parte Robinson, 86 U.S. 505, 510 (1873); Eilenbecker v. District Court of Plymouth
County, 134 U.S. 31, 38 (1890); Bessette v. W.S. Conkey Co., 194 U.S. 324, 326
(1904).
OBLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 390 (4th ed. 1957).
'Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1 (1932).
sEx parte Earman, 85 Fla. 297, 95 So. 755 (1923).
GGompers v. Buck Stove and Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 441 (1911); Harnon, Civil and
Criminal Contempts of Court, 25 MODERN L. REV. 179 (1962); Golfarb, The Varieties
of the Contempt Power, 13 SYR. L. REV. 44 (1962).
[Vol. 32
2
Montana Law Review, Vol. 32 [1971], Iss. 2, Art. 1
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol32/iss2/1
THE INCREASING USE
complainant in a civil suit, such as payment of delinquent alimony, or to
coerce compliance with court orders in either civil or criminal cases. A
civil contempt sentence may call for a fine or imprisonment. However,
the offender is usually given an opportunity to "purge" himself by com-
plying with the court's directive.
Contempt is considered criminal if the punishment is punitive in
nature and is used to vindicate the court's authority and to punish for
past disobedience of its orders. 10 The punishment for criminal contempt
prescribes a definite period of time, or is in the form of a fine. No op-
portunity is given the offender to "purge" himself. An example of
criminal contempt is the use of offensive language, or offensive behavior,
tending to prevent the progress of a trial, or demonstration of disrespect
for the dignity and authority of the court.
The classification of contempt as civil or criminal generally does not
depend on the type of action out of which it arises." It depends on the
nature and purpose of the contempt proceeding. For example, even though
a criminal case may be on trial, the court may attempt to coerce com-
pliance with its order through the use of civil contempt. Conversely, un-
ruly behavior on the part of a lawyer in a civil suit may be punishable
as a criminal contempt. The classification of contempt as direct or in-
direct and criminal or civil, has led to much confusion. The confusion is
compounded in determining whether a contempt is civil or criminal de-
pending on the character and purpose of the proceedings, and whether the
criminal or civil contempt is direct or indirect depending on the casual
or geographical effect on the court's administration of justice.
In recent years, there has been a great increase in the use of sum-
mary punishment of both civil and criminal contempt.' 2 In summary
punishment the judge charges an alleged offender with contempt, and
inflicts punishment without a full formal hearing, the opportunity to
present evidence, or the assistance of counsel.' 3 "Summary" does not
necessarily mean "instant", but means the use of a much less formal pro-
cedure to inflict punishment that is usually given a contemnor.
The use of summary punishment is limited to direct contempt in both
civil and criminal contempt proceedings. The justification for its use is
the necessity of removing the obstruction to justice without the delay in-
volved in more formal proceedings. If the contempt is indirect, summary
punishment is unavailable. Its use cannot be justified in cases of indirect
contempt on the basis of the necessity of removing the obstruction to the
1°Gompers (supra) note 9.
"In Gompers, supra note 9 at 441, the Court stated that the distinction between crimi-
nal and civil contempt is found in the dominant character and purpose of the pro-
ceeding.
"'Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. (1951), resulted in several Supreme Court contempt
cases, including Yates v. United States, 355 U.S. 66 (1958) and Sacher v. United
States, 343 U.S. 1 (1952).1Sacher, supra note 12 at 455.
1971]
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administration of justice, since the contempt did not occur in the immediate
presence of the court.
Many writers and judges have expressed concern regarding the use
of summary punishment in criminal contempt proceedings. 1 4 Their fear
results from the unlimited power possessed by one man to punish another
man summarily to a long prison sentence, especially when the judge im-
posing the sentence is the one against whom the affront was directed.
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT CASES
Crvm CONTEMPT
As early as King Richard III, it was recognized that the Chancellor
of England could imprison a party for a contempt of court, in order to
secure obedience to the writs of the King, but not as punishment for the
disobedience.' 5 Therefore, civil contempt became widely used in England,
and eventually in the United States, to aid in the proper functioning of
the courts.
The usual punishment for civil contempt is a fine. However, many
civil contempt proceedings have resulted, not only in the imposition of a
fine, but also in imprisonment to coerce payment of the fine.'6 Summary
punishment is available to a court, provided the contempt was committed
within its immediate presence. If the contempt was indirect, the court must
afford the alleged contemnor a formal hearing.
There is general agreement among judges and writers that the use
of summary punishment is proper in civil contempt proceedings. 1'7 It is
commonly felt that a court must be able to coerce enforcement of its de-
crees and orders to further the administration of justice. The usual justifi-
cation for the use of summary punishment is that the contemnor ". . . holds
the keys to his freedom in his willingness to comply with the court's direc-
tive."i8 It is now well established that there is neither a necessity nor a
Constitutional basis for a jury trial in civil contempt proceedings.
"These writers and judges are discussed infra.
"Beale, Contempt of Court, Criminal and Civil, 21 HARV. L. REV. 161, 169-70, 174
(1908).
"Gompers, supra note 9 at 441.
"Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364 (1966). Judges, almost uniformly, concede
that the power to coerce a person through civil contempt is essential to the function-
ing of the courts. cf. Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165 169 (1958) (separate
opinion of Justice Frankfurter); United States v. Barnett, 376 U.S. 681, 728 (1964)
(Justice Goldberg dissenting), and 724 (Justices Black and Douglas dissenting).
"See Barnett, supra note 17 at 724, dissenting opinion of Justice Black. Justice Black
feels that courts should have power to impose conditional imprisonment for the pur-
pose of compelling a person to obey a valid order. Such coercion, where the de-
fendant ''carries the keys to freedom in his willingness to comply with the court's
order," is essentially a civil remedy designed for the benefit of other parties and
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In Shillitani v. United States,19 the petitioners refused to testify before
a grand jury under immunity granted by the district court, and were
found guilty of contempt in proceedings under Rule 42 (b) of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure. 20 Each petitioner was sentenced to two
years in prison, with the condition that he would be released sooner, if
and when he answered the questions. The Court of Appeals rejected their
Constitutional arguments that they were not indicted or given jury trials
on the ground that the sentences gave them an unqualified right to release
upon compliance with the orders to testify.
The Supreme Court looked to the "character and purpose" of the
contempt actions. Even though the petitioners were ordered imprisoned
for a definite period, their sentences clearly were intended to operate
"in a prospective manner-to coerce, rather than punish." The Court held
that the conditional nature of the sentences rendered the actions civil
contempt proceedings for which indictment and jury trial are not Con-
stitutionally required.
2 1
Several limitations were stated by the Court regarding the use of
civil contempt. First, the contemnor's continued defiance justifies holding
civil contempt proceedings and imposing a conditional imprisonment with-
out the safeguards of indictment and jury trial, provided the usual due
process requirements are met.22 Second, the justification for coercive im-
prisonment depends upon the ability of the contemnor to comply with the
court's order.23 Third, a court must exercise the least possible power ade-
quate to the end proposed.
2 4
Applying the above limitations, the Court found that since the grand
jury had been finally discharged, the petitioners had no further oppor-
tunity to purge themselves of contempt. The Court held that the sentences
were improper in extending beyond the cessation of the grand jury's
term, and ordered the release of the petitioners.
In Shillitani, the Court affirmed the rule that " . . courts have
inherent power to enforce compliance with their lawful orders through
civil contempt. ,'5 However, it failed to consider the district court's use
of Rule 42 which provides the procedure to be used in criminal contempt
cases. Rule 42 makes no provision for civil contempt proceedings. 26 Unden
Shillitani, the Court looks at the character and purpose of the contempt
'Shillitani, supra note 17; Comment, Contempt of Court-Recent Developments, 45
N.C. L. REV. 545 (1967).
'Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 42, supra note 2.
'Shillitani, supra note 17 at 365. In footnote 5 at page 369, the Court stated: 'On
the contrary, a criminal contempt proceeding would be characterized by the imposi-
tion of an unconditional sentence for punishment or deterrence.''
'Id. at 370, 371.
3Id. at 371.
1Id.; Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. 204, 231 (1821).
2 Shillitani, supra note 17 at 370.
'Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 42, supra note 2.
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actions and at the nature of the sentence imposed to classify the contempt.
Therefore, the district court's use of the procedure provided by Rule 42
would appear to be irrelevant, since the Court will disregard the improper
use of the criminal contempt procedure and resort to the "inherent power"
of courts to punish for civil contempts.
However, someone who is adjudged guilty of contempt might ap-
preciate knowing the nature of his sentence. Even though the sentence
was rendered under Rule 42 (Criminal Contempt Procedure), its condi-
tional nature might justify him in thinking he will not suffer the con-
sequences of a criminal contempt charge-imprisonment for a definite
period of time with no opportunity to purge himself. The Court has not
yet defined what elements will make a sentence rendered under criminal
contempt procedure sufficiently conditional to convert it into a civil con-
tempt. Furthermore, the Supreme Court has previously stated that
a mingling of civil and criminal contempt proceedings must be
shown to result in substantial prejudice before a reversal will be re-
quired. ''27
As to future contemnors with conditional sentences rendered under
Rule 42, the Shillitani case presents a dilemna. The only way to finally
decide whether the sentence imposed was for civil contempt is to appeal it
to the Supreme Court. If the Court decides that the sentence was not suf-
ficiently conditional, or was imposed to punish for past conduct, 28 the
contemnor will suffer the consequences of a criminal contempt conviction.
He will be unable to show that the mingling of civil and criminal contempt
proceedings "resulted in substantial prejudice" because he had sufficient
warning that it was criminal contempt when the judge proceeded under
Rule 42.29
In practical effect, the result of the case, on its facts, is satisfactory.
The district court's power to coerce obedience to its orders was upheld,
and the petitioners were released when it became impossible for them to
purge themselves. However, the mixture of civil and criminal contempt
should have made the judgment invalid since "civil and criminal con-
tempt procedures are quite different and call for the exercise of quite
different judicial powers."' Although the district court sought to coerce
"United States v. United Mine Workers of America, 330 U.S. 258 (1947).
'In Yates, supra note 12, the sentence imposed provided for imprisonment of one year,
but if the defendant would answer the equestions within 60 days, the judge would
accept her submission to the court's authority. The contempt was classified as crim-
inal.
29Id.
mIn Reina v. United States, 364 U.S. 507 (1960), Justice Black and Chief Justice
Warren dissented, stating in substance: This mixture of civil and criminal contempt
makes this judgment invalid since civil and criminal contempt procedures are quite
different and call for the exercise of quite different judicial powers. Also, this judg-
ment says that petitioner has not yet committed a crime and is being sentenced for
civil contempt for the sole purpose of coercing his compliance with the demand for
his testimony, but that if he fails to comply with this demand within the specified
period, he will have committed a criminal contempt. Thus the judgment seems to
[Vol. 32
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compliance with its orders, failure to comply resulted in a two year prison
sentence under Rule 42. Therefore, the contempt sentence represented
" .*,*a present adjudication of guilt for a crime to be committed in the
future. "31
The Shilliiani case makes it clear that there is no right to indictment
and jury trial if the Court finds the contempt proceedings civil in nature.
The case also demonstrates the confusion in the Federal district courts
regarding the extent and use of Rule 42 in dealing with contempts of court.
CRIMINAL CONTEMPT
A. Rule 42
The Supreme Court has declared summary proceedings in contempt
of court actions Constitutional.32 Summary punishment is restricted to
direct contempts. On practical grounds, its use is essential to the preser-
vation of order in judicial proceedings, and to enforcement of judgments
and orders of the courts." It facilitates the smooth flow of the trial,
34
discourages further disturbances and operates as a sobering effect on
others in the courtroom,3 5 and promotes the dignity of the court.3 6
Although no chance for preparation of a defense is afforded, there has
been a trend toward disqualification of the judge if he becomes "person-
ally embroiled" with the lawyer.
3 7
In indirect contempts, there is no necessity for the use of summary
proceedings. The alleged contemnor is given an opportunity to present a
defense in extenuation of the charges, and the judge has an opportunity
for reflection. However, when the indirect contempt consists of an affront
to the presiding judge, there has been a tendancy to call for disqualification
of the judge.
38
There is no provision in the Constitution regarding the extent and
limits of the p~ower to punish for contempt. Congress has attempted to
recognize and define the contempt power in various statutes. In the Act
of 1789, Congress provided that the courts of the United States ". . . shall
have power . .. to punish by fine or imprisonment, at the discretion of
said courts, all contempts of authority in any cause or hearing before the
represent a present adjudication of guilt for a crime to be committed in the future.
Therefore, a judgment invalid on its face can be challenged at any time.
=Id.
BlEx parte Robinson, supra note 5..
1Eilenbecker, supra note 5.
34Beale, supra note 15 at 172.
'5Note, Summary Proceedings in Direct Contempt Cases, 15 VANDERBILT L. REV. 241,
257 (1962).
wRespublica v. Oswald, 1 U.S. 318, 329 (1788).
70ffut v. United States, 348 U.S. 11 (1954).
IFederal Rules of Criminal Procedure 42, supra note 2; Lane, The Contempt Power v.
The Concept of A Fair Trial, 50 Ky. L. REV. 351 (1962).
1971]
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same.'' 39 Abuses arose from such a broad, undefined power,4 0 and the
Act of 1831 wcs passed. This Act still left problems in defining the extent
of the courts' authority.4 1 However, the power was rarely used until the
turn of the Century.
With the ")dvent of the "political" trial, and the increase in public
sentiment against new unpopular causes, the use of contempt, and the
lenfth of sentences imposed, greatly increased during the first half of
the present Century. 42 The most notable effort to curtail the use of sum-
mary punishment by Federal District Courts, and to delineate the pro-
cedu-re to be riced in criminal contempt proceedings, is Rule 42 of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
43
Rule 42 retains the distinction between direct contempts in sub-
division (a), and indirect contempts in subdivision (b). Under Rule 42
(a), the judge has the power to punish summarily any conduct that he
saw or heard in his actual presence However, 42 (a) is "reserved for ex-
ceptional circumstances."44
Rule 42 (b) provides the general mode of procedure to be used in all
criminal contempt cases. It provides for notice, hearing, time for prepara-
tion of a defense, admission to bail, and disqualification of the judge in
certain situations. 45 Furthermore, the right to a jury trial is provided in
"... any case in which an act of Congress so provides." Congress has
provided for thn right to a jury trial in three specific instances: 1. cases
in which the contemptuous act constitutes a crime under state or federal
law;46 2. cases, of constructive contempt arising out of labor disputes ;47




M1 Stat. 73, 82 (1789).
4°James H. Peck, a federal district judge, was sought to be impeached for imprisoning
and disbarring a man named Lawless for publishing a criticism of one of his opinions
in a case which was on appeal. Peck was acquitted, but the occasion resulted in a
drastic delimitation by Congress of the broad undefined power of the inferior federal
courts under the Act of 1789. For an account of this episode, see Nye v. United
States, 313 U.S. 33, 45 (1941).
414 Stat. 487 (1831). The first section of the Act provides: "That the power of the
several courts of the United States to issue attachments and inflict summary punish-
ments for contempts of court, shall not be construed to extend to any cases except the
misbehavior of any person or persons in the presence of the said courts, or as near
thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice, the misbehavior of any of the
officers or the said courts in their judicial transaction, and the disobedience or
resistance by any officer of the said courts, party, juror, or any other person or
persons, to any lawful writ, process, order, ruling, decree, or command of the said
courts." This Act limited summary proceedings in criminal contempt cases to acts of
direct contempt plus acts in disobedience of the court's writs. For an interpretation
of the Act, see Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United States, 247 U.S. 402 (1917).
"2See cases cited, supra note 12.
"Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 42, supra note 2.
"4H-arris v. United States, 382 U.S. 162, 164 (1965).
"Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 42, supra note 2.
4"Clayton Act §§ 21-24, 18 U.S.C. §§ 402, 3691 (1958).
47Norris-LaGuardia Act, § 11, 18 U.S.C. § 3692 (1958).
"1Civil Rights Act, 71 Stat. 638 (1957), 42 U.S.C. § 1995 (Supp. v. 1958).
[Vol. 32
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Although Rule 42 sought to curtail the increase in the use of criminal
contempt, at 'east regarding summary proceedings, an opposite result
has occurred. Rule 42 resulted in confusion in the Federal district courts
in the application of subdivisions (a) and (b).
In Brown v. United States,49 the petitioner refused to answer questions
relevant to a grand jury's investigation of possible Interstate Commerce
Act violations. The grand jury sought the aid of the district court which
granted the petitioner immunity, and ordered him to answer the questions.
The petitioner persisted in his refusal before the grand jury, and was
again brought before the judge. The judge proceeded to ask him the
questions, and iipon his refusal, sentenced him to 15 months in prison for
criminal contempt under Rule 42 (a).
The Supreme Court held that since his disobedience of the district
court's order occurred in its presence, it was proper for the court to
proceed under Rule 42 (a). Four dissenters concluded that the contempt
was already completed out of th- court's presence when the petitioner
refused to answer the questions before the grand jury, and the contempt
should not be ". . . reproduced in a command performance before the
court to justify summary disposition. "50
The procedure approved by the majority of the Court in the Brown
case was followed in subsequent cases.5 1 However, it was overruled in
Harris v. United States.52 In Harris, the Court was presented with a factual
situation, almost identical to the Brown case. The Court held that 42 (a)
was improperly applied since the real contempt occurred before the grand
jury in the petitioner's refusal to answer its questions, as directed by the
district court.
In Harris, the Court adopted the reasoning of the dissenting opinion
in Brown. The reason given for overruling Brown was that the petitioner's
refusal was not ". . . such an open. serious threat to orderly procedure that
'instant' and summary punishment, as distinguished from due and delib-
erate procedures ...was necessory. '.3 The Court held that 42 (a) was
cc **reserved for exceptional circumstances," such as an affront to the
dignity of the oourt, to quell a disturbance, or to stop insolent tactics.
If none of theqe exceptional circumstances are found, the Court stated
that 42 (b) provides the normal mode of procedure. 54
The contempt committed before the grand jury in the Harris case was
'Brown v. United States, 359 U.S. 41, 42 (1959).
'Id. at 54.
'Levine v. United States, 362 U.S. 610 (1960); Piemonte v. United States, 367 U.S.
556 (1961).
'Harris, supra note 44 at 167; Note, Criminal Procedure--Supreme Court Narrows
Scope of Summary Procedures in Federal Criminal Contempt Convictions, 1966 DUKE
L. REv. 814 (1966).
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indirect. The cbstruction to the administration of justice had occurred
befure the petitioner continued his contemptuous conduct in the presence
of the judge. On this basis alone, the Supreme Court could have required
the use of 42 (b), reserving 42 (a) for direct contempts. Although quite
vague, the Court's "exceptional circumstances" standard is justifiable in
view of '-he harshness of the consequences under 42 (a).
The Court has also carved oat other exceptions to Rule 42 (a) to
help clarify its application to criminal contempt cases. In Offutt v. United
States,55 a long trial was held in a Federal district court during which the
judge displayed personal animosity and lack of proper judicial restraint
toward defense counsel. At the close of the trial, the judge acting under
42 (a), oummarily found defense counsel guilty of criminal contempt for
"contumacious, and unethical conduct . during the trial," and sentenced
him to 10 days in prison.
The Supreme Court exercised its supervisory authority over the ad-
min'stration of criminal justice in the Federal courts, set aside the cause,
and remanded it to the district court for retrial before a different judge.
The record indicated that the judge, instead of representing the impersonal
authority of law, had permitted himself to become "personally embroiled"
with the lawyer. The Court stated that the power entrusted to a judge is
"wholly unrelated to his personal sensibilities, be they tender or rugged."56
Therefore, in a case of contempt by personal attack upon the judge, lie may,
"without flinching from his duty, properly ask that one of his fellow
judges take his place."'57
MOffutt, supra note 37.
MId. In Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575 (1964), a prosecution witness in a state
criminal trial was adjudged guilty of criminal contempt for his conduct as a witness
in a post trial hearing presided over by the judge before whom the contempt occurred
at trial. The witness, an attorney, was denied a continuance. He did not defend,
arguing only that a continuance and a hearing before another jurge should be af-
forded. The judge found the exclamation of the witness at trial, that he was being
"coerced and intimidated and badgered"; and that "the Court is suppressing the
evidence" to be disruptive contempt of court, and sentenced the witness to 10 days
in prison and to pay a fine.
The Supreme Court held that criticism of the court's rulings and failure to obey
the court's orders did not on these facts constitute a personal attack on the trial
judge so productive of bias as to require his disqualification in post trial contempt
proceedings. At page 584 the Court stated: "We cannot assume that judges are so
irascible and sensitive that they cannot fairly and impartially deal with a resistance
to their authority or with highly charged arguments about the soundness of their
decisions. This was disruptive, claiming being badgered, and coerced and suppression
of evidence, recalcitrant and disagreeable commentary, but hardly an insulting attack
upon the integrity of the judge carrying such potential for bias as to require dis-
qualification." Therefore, unlike Cook v. United States, 267 U.S. 517 (1925) and
Offutt, supra note 37, the Court did not feel that the trial judge permitted himself
to become personally embroiled with petitioner. Furthermore, the judge's characteri-
zation of the conduct as contemptuous, disorderly and a malingering was at most a
declaration of a charge against the petitioner, based on the judge's observations which
without more was not a constitutionally disqualifying prejudgment of guilt. See also,
Note, Summary Punishment for Contempts A Suggestion that Due Process Requires
Notice and Hearing Before an Independent Tribunal, 39 So. CAL. L. REV. 463 (1966).
5 'Ungar, supra note 56 at 585, citing Cooke v. United States, supra note 56 at 539.
[Vol. 32
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The Court, in the Offutt case, engrafted onto Rule 42 (a) a provision
for judicial self-restraint calling for self-disqualification similar to that
expressly provided in 42 (b). Th? "personally embroiled" test for self-
disqualification seems to provide an important safeguard to a contemnor
under the otherwise harsh procedure of 42 (a). However, in practical
effect, a judge who fails to exercise proper judicial restraint may have
difficulty in determining when he has become sufficiently embroiled to
call for his own disqualification. If he does disqualify himself, the lawyer
is still proceeded against for contempt of court by another judge. The
second judge will have to proceed under 42 (b) since the contempt did not
occur in his pr-eence. The lawyer may possibly get a fairer hearing and a
less severe penalty. However, even though both the original judge and the
lawyer may have been personally embroiled, only the lawyer could be
held guilty of criminal contempt.
Further exceptions to the procedure under 42 (a) were established
by other cases decided prior to Offutt and Harris. In Sacher v. United
States, 58 11 Communist Party leaders were convicted of violating the
Smith Act. After the trial, the judge acted under 42 (a) to find the
petitioners guilty of criminal contampt, and to impose jail terms up to 6
months."0 The 2entences they received were for long-continued conduct
in the immediate presence of the judge. They challenged the judge's use
of 42 (a) on the ground that "summary" means "instant", and the
judge's d1elay until after trial called for the use of 42 (b).
The Supreme Court held that 42 (a) allows the judge two alterna-
tives- he may immediately and summarily punish for a contempt committed
in his presence if he thinks delay will prejudice the trial; or, if he feels
the exigencies -,f the trial require that he defer judgment until its com-
ple ion, he may do so without extinguishing his power.
6 0
In reaching this conclusion, the Court decided that "summary" as
used in Rule 42 (a) does not refer to the timing of the contempt proceed-
ings with reference to the contempt, but refers to "a procedure which dis-
penses with the formality, delay and digression that would result from
the issuance of process, service of complaint and answer, holding hearings,
taking evidence, .... ,61 It felt that if summary punishment could be im-
posed instantly, sentences would be pronounced by judges "while smart-
ing under the irritation of the contemptuous act," rather than according
to a well-considered judgment.
58Sacher, supra note 12. See also, Note, Criminal Procedure-Contempt of Court-
Duration of Judge's Power to Punish Summarily, 99 U. PA. L. REV. 540 (1951).
Sacher, supra note 12 at 4. The Court quoted the lower court opinion, ''The record
discloses a judge sorely tried for many months of turmoil, constantly provoked by
useless bickering, exposed to offensive slights and insults, harried with interminable
repetition, who, if at times he did not conduct himself with impertubability of a
Rhadamanthus, showed considerably greater self-control and forbearance than it is
given to most judges to possess. "
'Id. at 11; Summary Punishment for Contempt, supra note 56.
61 d. at 10.
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The dissenting opinion felt that the judge in the district court was
not impartial. 2 The judge repeatedly called the lawyer a liar, which
marked "a drantic deviation from the desirable judicial standard. "63 The
diss.enters felt that, due to the conduct of the judge, he should not have
passed on the contempt charges he preferred, and that there should have
been notice, a hearing, and an opportunity for petitioners to defend them-
selves under 12 (b). Possibly, this dissent was the precedent for the
"personally embroiled" standard of the Offutt case. However, the dissent
went further and stated that the petitioners were Constitutionally en-
titled to a jury trial.
In the Sacher case, the acts of contempt occurred in the immediate
presence of the court and Rule 42 (a) would apply. The Supreme Court
had held previously that before summary contempt power should be in-
voked, there must be "an actual obstruction of justice .... ",64 However,
the Judge did riot act until the jury was adjourned to find a verdict. He
then asked the lawyers to stand up, read them the contempt certificates,
and held them all guilty of contempt.
If the purpose of summary punishment under 42 (a) is to prevent
"an actual obstruction of justice," there was no need for its use in the
Sacher case. The contempt for which the petitioners were convicted was
a course of conduct throughout the trial. The trial proceeded all the way
to adjournment of the jury without the necessity of resorting to summary
punishment. Therefore, there was no "actual obstruction to justice." But,
this argument overlooks the use of the contempt power to preserve the
digtiity and authority of the court. On this ground, the result of the
Sacher case is justifiable.
When contemptuous conduct occurs in the presence of the court, the
judge may "instantly" hold the offender guilty of criminal contempt.
However. the offender will often be a lawyer, and the effect of a criminal
contempt conviction may prejudice the result of his client's case. There-
fore. the exception to Rule 42 (a) in giving the trial judge the alternative
to punish instantly or to wait until the trial has ended has a supportable
foundation. 5
A restriction on the sentencing practices of the Federal district courts
under Rule 42 (a) was announced in Yates v. United States.6 6 In Yates,
62
1d. at 16, 17.
MId. at 18.
O"Ex parte Hudgings, 249 U.S. 378, 383 (1919).
'In Sacher, supra note 12 at 14. Justice Black in dissent called for a reversal because
the judge should not have passed on the contempt charges he had preferred, there
should have been notice, a hearing and an opportunity for petitioners to defend them-
selves, and they were constitutionally entitled to a jury. According to Black, the
defendants had to defend Communist leaders and the judge charged them with fol-
lowing a concerted course deliberately designed to bring the whole judicial system
into public contempt and disgrace. He stated at page 18: "'. . . the menace is most
ominous for lawyers who are obscure, unpopular or defenders of unpopular or un-
orthodox causes. " I
"Yates, supra note 12.
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the petitioner and 13 co-defendants were tried for conspiracy to violate
the Smith Act. While testifying in her own defense, the petitioner refused
to answer questions about the Communist membership of both a co-defend-
ant, who had rested his case, and a non-defendant. She was imprisoned for
civil contempt to coerce her to Puswer. She later refused to answer 11
similar questions, and the judge notified her that he would treat the 11
refusals as criminal contempts under 42 (a). After the close of the trial,
the judge found her guilty of 11 separate criminal contempts. She was
sentenced to imprisonment for 1 year on each count, with the sentences
to run concurrently. However, the sentence also provided that if she would
answer the questions within 60 days, the court would accept her submission
to the court's authority.
The Supreme Court held that there was only a single contempt be-
cause the questions all related to identification of others as Communists
after she had made it clear that she would not be an informer.67 The
Court recognized that imprisonment through civil contempt cannot be
used to eoerce evidence after the termination of a trial. However, it felt
that the sentences were not imposeli to coerce answers to the 11 questions,
but to "vindicate the authority of the court" by punishing the petitioner's
defiance. The Court stated:
The judge did hope that petitioner would still purge herself by
bowing to the authority of the court by answering within 60 days
after sentencing or at the time of sentencing, but he acted under
Rule 35 which says: "Correction or Reduction of Sentence .... The
court may reduce a sentence within 60 days after the sentence is
imposed. . .. "
The Court remanded the case to the district court for appropriate
resentencing in light of its finding of only one contempt.
Three Justices dissented, finding the case "a shocking instance of
the abuse of judicial authority.''69
In a subsquent decision,70 Oie Supreme Court exercised its super-
visory power and set aside the new one-year sentence imposed by the
district court. On remand, the trial judge had imposed the same sentence
for this single offense that it had imposed for the 11 original charges.
The Supreme Court felt that the time the petitioner had already served,
7 months, was an adequate punishment for her offense, and ordered her
release.
The Yates case preceded Shillitani v. United States.71 In Shillitani,
the trial judge acted under Rule 42 (b) to sentence each petitioner to two
years in prison. but with the condition that they would be released sooner




'Yates v. United States, 356 U.S. 363, 366-67 (1958).
7See the form of the sentence in Shillitani, supra note 17.
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42 (a) to sentence the petitioner to 11 concurrent 1-year terms in prison,
but with the condition that she would be released if she answered certain
questions within 60 days. The Supreme Court classified the Shillitani pro-
ceedings as civil contempt. It classified the Yates proceedings as criminal
contempt.
The two cases are difficult to reconcile. In Shillitani, the Court ig-
nored the judge's use of criminal contempt procedure under 42 (b),
and looked to the purpose and character of the sentence he had imposed.
The contempt sentence was imposed to coerce answers relevant to the
grand jury's inquiry while it was in session. In Yates, the Court found
that the sentence rendered under 42 (a) was to vindicate the authority
of the court by punishing the petitioner's defiance. That is, the Court
held that the petitioner was given 60 days after trial to purge herself of
her guilt for criminal contempt by bowing to the authority of the judge,
and not for the purpose of coercing answers to the 11 questions.
In Yates, the petitioner was originally held in civil contempt to coerce
answers to several questions. She was later held in criminal contempt for the
very same reason. The primary object of the judge in these proceedings
was to get answers to the questions. If the questions had been answered
within the 60-day period after trial, the sentence would not have been
imposed. Therefore, with its purpose being to coerce, and its nature
being conditiopal, the sentence could just as easily have been classified
as civil contempt, as in the Shillitani case. It should make no difference
that the sentence was imposed after the trial. The answers, although no
longer relevant to the co-defendant, could affect the interests of the non-
defendant. The.re was still a valid reason for coercing the answers other
than vindicativg the authority of the court.
The Yates case demonstrates the danger in thinking, as'a contemnor,
that the conditional nature of the contempt sentence will not result in
imprisonment for a definite period of time.
7 2
B. Constitutional Right to Jury Trial
There has been a tremendous amount of disagreement concerning the
use of summary punishment in criminal contempt proceedings. 73 The
Supreme Court repeatedly held, until recently, that there is no Constitu-
tional right to a jury trial in any criminal or civil contempt cases.
74
Probably, the most notable case reflecting the split of opinion regarding
jury, trial is Green v.United States.
7 5
72See Justice Goldberg"s dissent in Barnett, supra note 17, and Justice Black's dissent
in Green, supra note 17, in which he was joined by Justice Douglas, and Chief Justice
Warren's dissent in Barnett, supra note 17, Levine v. United States, 362 U.S. 610,
620 (1960), Nilva v. United States, 352 U.S. 385, 396 (1957) and Sacher, supra
note 12 at 13.
7 See cases cited, supra note 5. See also Note, Constitutional Law-Criminal Contempt
-Right To A Public Trial, 15 S.W.L.J. 427 (1961).
74See cases cited, supra note 72; Lane, 'The Contempt Pow~r, supra note 38.
'Green, supra note 17 at 181.
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Prior to the Green case, the petitioners had been convicted of violating
the Smith Act in Dennis v. United States.76 While out on bail pending
appeal, their counsel were served with copies of a proposed surrender
order. They disappeared and remained fugitives for more than 41/2 years.
When they surrendered, they were tried in the district court without in-
dictment or jury trial for criminal contempt under the Clayton Act,
77
and Rule 42 (b), for disobedience of the surrender order. The sentences
imposed for criminal contempt were 3 years in prison, and one of the
cases was appealed in the name of Green v. United States.
Under the Clayton Act, contempts were to be punished "in conformity
to prevailing usages at law . . ." Bfore the Green case, no Federal district
court had imposed a contempt sentence of more than 1 year. However, the
Supreme Court found no abuse of discretion in the imposition of 3 year
sentences on the ground that Congress had not incorporated into the
Clayton Act "the sentencing practices up to that date .... ",78 Instead,
contempts were to be tried "under familiar contempt procedures . ..
among other things, by the court rather than a jury.,'79
The Court rejected the petitioner's Constitutional argument that
criminal contempts required prosecution by indictment for the reason
that such contempts should be classified as "infamous crimes" within the
meaning of the 5th Amendment. The Court said that contempts have
always had a unique status under the Constitution, whether subject to
infamous punishment or not. 0 The Court based its decision on its estab-
lished precedent that criminal contempt has never been subject to jury
trial either Constitutionally or historically. It stated:
... [Olf course the summary procedures followed by English courts
prior to the adoption of the Constitution in dealing with many con-
tempts of court did not embrace the use of either grand or petit jury.
See 4 Blackstone Commentaries 283-287. It would indeed be anom-
alous to conclude that contempts subject to sentences of imprison-
ment for over 1 year are "infamous crimes" under the Fifth Amend-
ment (for indictment purposes) although they are neither "crimes"
nor "criminal prosecutions" far the purpose of jury trial within
the meaning of Art. III, § .2, and the Sixth Amendment. sM
7618 U.S.C. §§ 401, 412, 38 Stat. 730, 738-40 (1914).
"Green, supra note 17 at 181.
78Id.; Goldfarb, The Constitution and Contempt of Court, 61 MicH. L. REV. 283 (1962);
Note, Criminal Contempt and Trial by Jury, 8 Wm. & MARY L. REV. 76 (1966).
"Green, supra note 17 at 183. The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution provides:
"No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, un-
less on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury . . . . " The argument of the
petitioners was that proceedings for criminal contempts, if contempts are subjct to
prison terms of more than one year, must be based on grand jury indictments under
the above clause of the Fifth Amendment. Since an " Iinfamous crime"I is one punish-
able by imprisonment in a penitentiary [Mackin v. United !States, 117 U.S. 348
(1886)], and since imprisonment in a pemtentiary can be imposed only if a crime
is subject to imprisonment exceeding one year [18 U.S.C. § 4083], the petitioners
asserted that criminal contempts, if subject to such punishment, are infamous crimes
under the Amendment.
9'Id. at 187.
"Id. at 184,85. The Sixth Amendment provides in part: "in all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of
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The petitioners argued that prior Supreme Court decisions which
denied the right to jury trial in criminal contempt proceedings had been
based upon an "historical error", or a misunderstanding as to the scope
of the power of English courts at the early common law to try summarily
for contempts b,2 Therefore, such error should not be extended to a denial
of the right to grand jury indictment.
The Supreme Court looked at recent historical research into English
contempt practices, predating the adoption of the Constitution, and
found no such clear error, but only much obscurity. s' The Court stated:
[I]t at least seems clear that English practice by the early
Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries comprehended the use of
summary powers of conviction by courts to punish for a variety of
contempts committed within and outside the court. Such indeed is
the statement of English law of this period found in Blackstone ...
who explicitly recognized use of a summary power by English courts
to deal with disobedience of court process ... "
The Court also cited, as support, the Act of 1789 which first attempted
to define the contempt power. According to the Court, the Act was passed
by the members of the "recent Constitutional Convention who no doubt
shared the prevailing views in the American colonies of English law as
expressed in Blackstone. ''5
Justice Black wrote the dissenting opinion.8 6 He could find no
justification in history, in necessity, nor in the Constitution for trying
those charged with criminal contempt of court in a manner "wholly dif-
ferent from those accused of disobeying any other mandate of the state."
Justice Black called summary proceedings of punishment for criminal
contempt 'an anomaly in the law," and would have accorded the petition-
ers the right to be tried by jury after indictment by a grand jury "in
the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district
shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation.'' Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution provides in part:
"The trial of all crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by jury.... "
The Court in Green stated at 185 that "beginning with the Judiciary Act of 1789,
Congress has consistently preserved the summary nature of the contempt power in
the Act of 1831 and its statutory successors, departing from this traditional notion
only in specific instances where it has provided for jury trial for certain categories
of contempt. ''
"The historical error was that summary proceedings for contempt originated from an
undelivered opinion of Justice Wilmot in England. The case, King v. Almon, 1765,
Wilmot's Notes, 243, justified summary treatment as being founded upon immemorial
usage. However, that statement was somewhat incorrect according to Fox in his
treatise, THE HIsToRy OF CONTEMPT OF COURT, (1922), as there was no common law
precedent until 1720. See, Criminal Contempt and Trial by Jury, supra note 78;
Summary Proceedings in Direct Contempt Cases, supra note 35.
"Fox, The King v. Almon Parts I and II, 24 L. Q. REv. 184, 266 (1908); Fox, THE
HISTORY OF CONTEMPT OF COURT, 5-43 (1927).
"4Green, supra note 17 at 185.
'Id. at 189. Justice Frankfurter concurred. He felt that regardless of conflicting
views, it was indisputable that it has always been constitutional to punish for con-
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full accordance with all the procedural safeguards required by the Con-
stitution for 'all criminal prosecutions.' ''87
Justice Black also contended that the power of summary punishment
in one man, the very judge who charges others with violation of his com-
mand and sits in judgment on his own charges, precludes an indispensable
element of due process of law "an objective . . .impartial tribunal. .. ."
To support his view that the right to jury trial extends to criminal
contempts, Justice Black referred to recent scholarship, historical error,
the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. According to Black, recent scholar-
ship had refuted the myth of "gimmemorial usage", since until the late
17th Century or early 18th Century, English courts, except the Court of
Star Chamber, "neither claimed nor had the, power to punish for con-
tempts committed out of court by summary process." '8
Black stated that earlier cases "erroneously assumed that courts had
always possessed the power to punish all contempts summarily as being
inherent in their very being. ' ' 9 Furthermore, those who adopted the
Constitution and Bill of Rights sought to protect individual liberty from
unchecked power in government officials. As a result, the 5th, 6th, 7th,
and 8th Amendments were adopted to confine the power of courts and
judges regarding the procedures used in the trial of crimes.9 0 Black stated:
. .. I find it difficult to understand how it can be maintained that
the same people who manifested such great concern for trial by
jury as to explicitly embody it in the Constitution for every $20
civil suit could have intended that this cherished method should not
be available to those threatened With long imprisonment for the
crime of contempt.'
The majority of the Court relied heavily on the "necessity" argu-
ment that the regular criminal processes of indictment and jury trial
would not result in conviction and punishment of a fair share of those
guilty by violating court orders. Black answered this argument by saying
87Id.
Sid. at 202. Justice Black cites Fox, THE HISTORY OF CONTEMPT OF COURT, supra
note 83 and Frankfurter and Landis, Power of Congress Over Procedure in Criminal
Contempts in "Inferior" Federal Courts-A Study in Separation of Powers, 37
HARv. L. REV. 1010, 1042-52 (1924).
'9Curtis and Curtis, The History of a Notion in the Law of Criminal Contempt, 41
HARV. L. REv. 51 (1927).
°°Green, supra note 17 at 207. Justice Black stated that there was not word of dis-
cussion in the Constitutional Convention affirming the jurisdiction of courts to punish
a contempt by summary process, a power inherently alien to the method of punishing
other public offenses provided by the Constitution. He also stated that contempts
were not the subject of major punishment in the colonial era and he could find no
instance of unconditional imprisonment for even months in an era when extremely
harsh penalties were commonplace. The Declaration of Independence had as a princi-
pal complaint against England the denial of trial by jury, and to this extent, Justice
Black added: "Witness the fierce opposition of the colonials to the courts of ad-
miralty in which judges instead of citizen juries were authorized to try those
charged with violating certain laws."
MId. at 209, 210. Justice Black questioned whether anyone would have dared to take
the 'floor of the Constitutional Convention and suggest that federal' courts be given
the power to summarily imprison a person for contempt.
1971]
17
Hilts: The Increasing Use of the Power of Contempt
Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 1971
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
that the jury "injects a democratic element into the law, . . ." and "cheap,
easy convictions, were not the primary concern of those who adopted the
Constitution and the Bill of Rights.'"92
The Green case, at least for the time-being, laid to rest any further
Constitutional challenges against the summary punishment of criminal
contempts. However, eight years later, the Governor and Lientenant
Governor of Mississippi, in United States v. Barnett,93 challenged their
criminal contempt charges for disobedience of three injunctions.9 4 The
Supreme Court, citing Green, held that they were not entitled to a jury
trial as a matter of Constitutional right.
The Barnett case is significant, not for its affirmation of Green, but
for its footnote no. 12, which provided a hint for future decisions:
In view of the impending contempt hearing, effective administration
of justico requires that this dictum be added: Some members of the
Court are of the view that, without regard to the seriousness of the
offense, punishment by summary trial without a jury would be
constitutionally limited o that penalty provided for petty offenses.'
It was nowhere revealed which members of the Court were of this view.
However, it seemed to indicate a definite change in attitude on the Court.
In Barnett, Justice Goldberg wrote an important dissent.9 6 He felt
that the petitioners' claim to trial by jury should not be denied on the
"authority of the history of criminal contempt at the time of the Con-
stitution," nor on established precedent which relied on that history.
7
According to Goldberg, his review of history at the time of the Constitution
revealed that courts were authorized to impose minor criminal penalties
without trial by jury for a variety of trivial offenses, including criminal
contempts. Therefore, the reason why criminal contempts were not tried
by a jury was that the penalties then authorized and imposed were gen-
erally minor.
Goldberg concluded that the petitioners' claim should be evaluated
by analyzing the real nature of criminal contempts, and applying "the
policy of the Constitutional requirement of trial by jury in 'all crimes' and
'all criminal prosecutions.' "98 Black also dissented.9 9 He restated his
921d. at 216. Justices Brennan and Douglas and Chief Justice Warren dissented on the
basis that the evidence was insufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that
petitioner was guilty of criminal contempt.
OSee cases cited, supra note 17.
"Barnett, supra note 17 at 682.
9Id. at 695.
MId. at 724, Chief Justice Warren and Justice Douglas concurring.
0Id. at 752.
9Id. at 751. "The available evidence seems to indicate that . .. at the time of the
Constitution criminal contempts triable without a jury were generally punishable by
trivial penalties, and that . . . all types of ''petty" offenses punishable by trivial
penalties were generally triable without a jury. This history justifies the imposition
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Constitutional argument for trial by jury in all "criminal presecutions,"
but welcomed footnote no. 12 as giving those charged with criminal con-
tempt a trial with all the Bill of Rights safeguards including indictment
by grand jury and trial by petit jury.100
Shortly after Barnett, the Supreme Court imposed an important lim-
itation on the use of summary punishment in the sentencing practices of
Federal district courts. In Cheff v. Schnackenberg,11 the petitioner was
held in criminal contempt for having aided a company in violating a
pendente lite order issued by the district court to enforce the Federal
Trade Commission's cease and desist order against the company. The
petitioner was denied a jury trial, and was given a 6 month prison sentence.
Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the sentence of 6 months
for criminal contempt did not warrant treatment other than as a petty
offense. Therefore, the denial of a jury trial was proper. However, the
Court recognized that by limiting its decision to sentences less than 6
months, it left in doubt instances involving sentences greater than 6
months. The Court sought to remove the doubt by exercise of its super-
visory power, and ruled that henceforth, "sentences exceeding six months
for criminal contempt may not be imposed by federal courts absent a
jury trial or waiver thereof .... "o102
The Court rejected the petitioner's Constitutional argument that the
right to jury trial should attach to all criminal contempts including petty
offenses. Its holding that six months imprisonment was the maximum
sentence that could be imposed without a jury in federal cases, was de-
termined by "objective indications of the seriousness with which society
regards the offense . . ." The "objective" criteria was found by analogy
to a congressional statute which made an offense punishable by six months
or less or a fine of not more than $500 a petty offense.10 3 Therefore, a 6
month non-jury contempt sentence was permissible under the Cheff decis-
ion.
Justice Harlan dissented. He argued that it would be better to follow
the Green case, since in administration of the majority's holding, the dis-
trict court judge would have to look ahead to the sentence to be given in
order to determine whether there is a right to a jury trial. By so doing,
the court would have to determine the precise facts which the trial would
reveal. 04
'Id. at 726-27.
'0 Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373 (1966). See also, Note, Constitutional Law:
The Supreme Court Constructs a Limited Right to Trial by Jury for Federal Criminal
Contemnors, 1967 DuKE L. REv. 632 (1967); Contempt of Court-Recent Develop-
ments, supra note 19.
"°'Cheff, supra note 101 at 380.
1-18 U.S.C. § 1 (1964), provides in part: "[a]ny misdemeanor, the penalty for which
does not exceed imprisonment for a period of six months and a fine of not more than
$500 or both."
'° Cheff, supra note 101 at 380-82.
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Justice Douglas also wrote a dissenting opinion.' 0l He reiterated his
view that criminal contempts are "crimes" within the meaning of Art.
III, § .2, and "criminal prosecutions" within the meaning of the 6th
Amendment, both of which guarantee the right to trial by jury. He also
disagreed with the majority's method of defining a petty offense by ref-
erence to the sentence actually imposed. The method he proposed would
be to use the maximum potential sentence. 10 6 However, until petty crim-
inal contempts are properly defined and isolated from other species of
contempts, Justice Douglas concluded that "punishment for all manner of
criminal contempts can Constitutionally be imposed only after a trial by
jury. ''107
The Cheff case seemed to place a severe limitation on the power of
judges to summarily punish offenders with sentences in excess of 6 months.
Most judges would probably prefer to keep within the sentencing limits to
avoid cluttering their already crowded dockets. However, in practical
effect, the summary power is not as restricted as Cheff may make it ap-
pear. Prior to imposing the sentence, the judge has a guideline of 6 months.
That is, he may isolate each incident of contempt in separate counts, and
issue sentences not in excess of 6 months for each count. He may thereby
impose a total sentence well in excess of 6 months, and without any limit-
ation. l08
The sentence will stand unless the Supreme Court finds that there
was a lack of "exceptional circumstances" (Harris), that the judge had
become "personally embroiled" (Offutt) or that the counts all relate to a
single contempt (Yates).
In Cheff, the Court seemed to adopt the view, implied in footnote no.
12 of the Barnett case, that all types of petty offenses punishable by
trivial penalties were generally triable without a jury at the time of the
Constitution. Therefore, such history justified the imposition of no more
than trivial penalties for criminal contempts without trial by jury. Al-
though the majority was careful to place its decision on its supervisory
power rather than on Constitutional grounds, the Constitutional right to
a jury trial in criminal contempt cases was soon to be recognized.
In Bloom v. Illinois,109 the petitioner was convicted of criminal con-
tempt in an Illinois state court and was sentenced to 2 years imprisonment
'MId. at 384. Justice Black concurred in this dissent.
1"Id. at 389. Justice Douglas stated: "Resolution of the question of whether a par-
ticular offense is or is not "petty" cannot be had by confining the inquiry to the
length of sentence actually imposed. That is only one of many factors. As the analysis
of the court in Clawans [District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617, 628 (1937)]
demonstrates, the character of the offense itself must be considered. The relevance
of the maximum possible sentence is that is may be taken as a guage of social and
ethical judgments of the community."
101 d. at 389, 393.
"'See discussion, supra note 4. This method was employed by Judge Hoffman.
'Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968).
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for willfully petitioning to admit to probate a will falsely prepared and
executed after the putative testator's death. He was denied a jury trial.
The Supreme Court held that the Constitution guarantees the right to
jury trial for a criminal contempt punished by a two year prison term,
and such right extends to the States through the 14th Amendment. 110
A majority of the Court had finally become convinced that ". . . serious
contempts are so nearly like other serious crimes that they are subject to
the trial provisions of the Constitution.""' The Court reaffirmed its view
in Cheff that criminal contempt is a petty offense unless the punishment
makes it a serious one. When the legislature has not defined the serious-
ness of the offense by fixing a maximum penalty which may be imposed,
the trial court must look to the penalty actually imposed to determine
whether the offender is entitled to a jury trial. The Court found "objective
indications of the seriousness which society regards the offense," and held
that the two year sentence the petitioner had received entitled him to a
jury trial. However, the Court would not define the boundary between
petty and serious offenses in the States.
The rejection of its prior decisions did not rest entirely on historical
grounds.1 2i The Court found more compelling reasons for finding the
right to jury trial fundamental in criminal contempt cases. The right to
jury trial is a protection against the arbitrary exercise of official power.
Though a public wrong, contemptuous conduct "often strikes at the most
vulnerable and human qualities of a judge's temperament." As a result,
extremely serious penalties are imposed upon conviction."
3
The Court was also willing to cope with malfunctioning of the jury
system which may acquit those who should be punished. It found no
necessity in the use of the summary power to maintain the independence
of the judiciary, nor did it feel that additional time and expense in jury
trials would handicap the effective functioning of the courts.
As a result of the Bloom case, there is no Constitutional right to a
"°In the same term of court, the Supreme Court had decided Duncan v. Louisiana, 391
U.S. 145 (1968). In Duncan, the petitioner was sentenced to 60 days in prison and
received a $150 fine under Louisiana law which provided that simple battery is a
misdemeanor, punishable by a maximum of two years and a $300 fine. He was denied
a jury trial since the Louisiana Constitution grants jury trials only in cases where
capital punishment or imprisonment at hard labor may be imposed. The Supreme
Court held that the right to trial by jury, guaranteed defendants in criminal cases in
federal courts by Article III of the United States Constitution and by the Sixth
Amendment thereto, was also guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to defendants
tried in State courts. The penalty authorized by the law of the locality may be taken
as a guage of its social and ethical judgments." Therefore, a crime punishable by
two years is, based on past and contemporary standards in this country, a serious
crime and not a petty offense, thereby entitling petitioner to a jury trial.
"'Bloom, supra note 109 at 198.
"'Id. at 198-99.
"'1d. at 208. The Court stated: "We place little credence in the notion that the inde-
pendence of the judiciary hangs on the power to try contempts summarily and are not
persuaded that the additional time and expense possibly involved in submitting serious
contempts to juries will seriously handicap the effective functioning of the courts."
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jury trial in State civil contempt cases nor in criminal contempt cases,
which involve only petty offenses. There is a Constitutional right to jury
trials in all State criminal contempt cases involving serious offenses
(where) the legislature has authorized a maximum penalty dividing petty
and serious offenses. When the legislature has stated its judgment about
the seriousness of an ordinary criminal prosecution, the severity of the
penalty authorized, not the penalty actually imposed, is the basis to use
to determine whether an offense is petty. If there is no such legislative
determination, then the penalty actually imposed is the standard.
The Bloom case leaves State court judges in doubt as to the length
of sentences they can impose without a jury trial. The present limitation
is two years or as otherwise provided by State legislature. However, the
Supreme Court has indicated that one year, or possibly 6 months will be
the dividing line in the States as to petty-serious classification. In 49 of
the 50 States, the right to jury trial is provided for criminal sentences
exceeding one year. In fact, there are only two instances, aside from
Louisiana, where a State denies jury trial for a crime by imprisonment
for longer than six months.
1 14
In the Federal system, the dividing line between petty and serious
offenses is six months. The district court judge may still segment his
counts, and impose sentences of six months for each count thereby avoiding
the jury trial requirement. However, he has another alternative to use to
control the life of a contemnor for a substantial period of time without a
jury trial. The alternative is provided in Frank v. United States." 5
In the Frank case, the petitioner was convicted of criminal contempt
for violation of an injunction issued by a Federal district court at the re-
quest of the Securities and Exchange Commission. His demand for a jury
trial was denied. Upon his conviction, the court suspended imposition of
sentence, and placed him on probation for three years.
The Supreme Court held that since the petitioner's actual penalty was
one which could be imposed upon those convicted of otherwise petty
offenses, a jury trial was not required. To reach its conclusion, the Court
reaffirmed its rationale for determining whether an offense is petty or
serious."16 It found that Congress had placed no specific limits on punish-
ment for criminal contempt, nor had it classified contempts as serious or
11in Duncan, supra note 110 at 161, footnote 33, the Court reviewed the criminal
statutes of the 50 states. It found that in 49 of the 50 states, offenses are tried
without a jury trial if the punishment which is authorized is no more than one year in
jail. The Court found only two instances, aside from Louisiana, in which a jury trial
was allowed only for capital punishment or imprisonment at hard labor and was not
allowed in cases of imprisonment for longer than six months. These two instances
are New Jersey, which provides a one year maximum sentence without a jury trial,
and New York, which provides that in New York City, a jury trial extends only to
offenses exceeding one year.
"'Frank v. United States, 395 U.S. 147 (1969).
"The rationale is stated most concisely in Dyke v. Taylor Implement Manufacturing
Co., 391 U.S. 216, 219-20 (1968).
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petty. Therefore, the severity of the penalty actually imposed indicated
the seriousness of the particular offense.
117
The Court looked to the Federal probation statute, and found that
Congress had not indicated that the additional penalty of a term of pro-
bation placed usual petty offenses in the serious category. The Court stated:
Probation is, of course, a significant infringement of personal free-
dom, but it is certainly less onerous a restraint than jail itself. In
noncontempt cases, Congress has not viewed the possibility of five
years' probation as onerous enough to make an otherwise petty
offense "serious."'m
The Court provided that upon revocation of probation, the lower
court may impose any sentence which might originally have been imposed.
Under the Cheff case, that sentence would be limited to six months im-
prisonment and a $500 fine without a jury trial. Therefore, under the
Frank case, the maximum nonjury penalty authorized in petty criminal
contempt cases in Federal district courts is not simply six months and a
$500 fine. Th. contemnor "may be placed on probation for up to five
years and, if the terms of probation are violated, he may then be im-
prisoned for six months."
1 9
Chief Justice Warren wrote a dissenting opinion. 120 He called the
decision "an alarming expansion of the nonjury contempt power." He
stated:
Now freed from the checks and restraints of the jury system, local
judges can achieve, for a term of years, significant control over
groups with unpopular views through the simple use of the injunctive
and contempt power together with a punitive employment of the
probation device, the conditions of which offer almost unlimited
possibilities for abuse.n
According to Justice Warren, the lower court may use this device
to impose a lengthy probation sentence up to five years, and after four
years and 11 months, find a probation violation and impose a six month
prison term, all without a jury trial. Finding that Congress "clearly did
not intend the maximum five year probation period to be any indication
u1Frank, supra note 115 at 149, footnote 2. Of course, if the statute, creating the of-
fense specifies a maximum penalty, then that penalty is the relevant criterion. See
also Dyke, supra note 116.
"=Frank, supra note 115 at 151-52.
119Id. at 150, footnote 4. If imposition of sentence is suspended, the court may upon
revocation of probation "impose any sentence which might originally have been
imposed." 18 U.S.C. § 3653. Under Cheff, supra note 101, that sentence would be
limited to six months imprisonment.
"Id. at 153. Justices Harlan and Stewart adhered to their dissents in Bloom and Cheff.
Justices Black and Douglas also dissented, calling for jury trial for those who commit
offenses against courts, since they should be no less entitled to the Bill of Rights
than those who commit offenses against the public in general.
11IM. at 158. Chief Justice Warren in his dissent stated: "In orienting the probation
system toward the individual criminal and not the crime itself, and in making it
available for felonies and misdemeanors as well as petty offenses, Congress clearly
did so [sic] intend the maximum five year probation period to be any indication of
society's view of the seriousness of crimes in general, except to provide that proba-
tion is inappropriate for capital or life sentence cases."
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of society's view of the seriousness of crimes in general,' '122 he preferred
reaffirmance of the holding in the Cheff case that six months is the
maximum permissible non-jury sentence, whether served on probation, or in
prison, or both. Therefore, if probation were revoked after four months,
only a two months' jail term could be imposed in Federal district courts.
The Cheff and Bloom cases sought to limit "arbitrary official power"
by taking away from one man the power to inflict summarily lengthy
prison terms. The Frank case seems to return that power to the judge in
an almost unbridled form. Without any jury deliberation, the judge can
control the life of a contemnor for five years and six months. However,
it could be argued that such control is only minimal in its effect on the
contemnor, and is "certainly less onerous than jail itself." Furthermore,
if the contemnor behaves himself, he will never have to suffer the con-
sequences of a prison term.
Conversely, it is arguable that the amount of control over a contemnor
by a judge could make a jail sentence "less onerous" than the conditions
of probation. In the Frank case, the conditions of the probation required
the petitioner to make monthly reports to his probation officer, to as-
sociate only with law-abiding persons, to maintain reasonable hours, to work
regularly, to report all job changes to his probation officer, and to leave
the probation district only with the permission of his probation officer.
Chief Justice Warren suggests that a strict application of the conditions
could "effectively deprive" a contemnor of any meaningful freedom for
over five years.
1 23
Upon finding an offender guilty of criminal contempt, the lower
court could suspend imposition of a five-year sentence, but place him on
probation for that period. The court could require the probation officer to
construe the hours requirement strictly and refuse permission to leave the
jurisdiction. This application would result in denying the offender his
freedom of movement. Furthermore, by insisting that he work regularly,
the court could regulate the contemnor's working life. Because of the re-
quirement that he associate only with law-abiding citizens, he would be
limited in his freedom of association. He would thus choose his associates
at his peril. With such a strict application of the conditions, it would be a
simple matter finding a violation of probation and imposing a six month
sentence. As an extreme example, the court could find that he had failed
to associate with a law-abiding citizen by having lunch with an individual
who had recently received a traffic ticket.
Although this application of the conditions is somewhat severe, and
possibly unlikely, it does serve to illustrate the fact that probation may not
always be "less onerous than jail itself," especially when a six-month
jail term may be imposed for any violation at any time during the pro-
bationary period. If a six-month prison sentence is only a petty offense, it
"lId.
'2 Id. at 153, 154.
[Vol. 32
24
Montana Law Review, Vol. 32 [1971], ss. 2, Art. 1
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol32/iss2/1
THE INCREASING USE
would seem that substantial control over a man's life for five years plus
a possible six-month prison term should remove the offense from the petty
ctaegory. In any event, a jury should decide whether or not a man's life
should be restricted for five years and six months.
If sobriety cannot be maintained under the methods prescribed in the
preceding cases, and persistent disorderly conduct disrupts the adminis-
tration of justice, a federal judge has new and interesting alternatives to
insure decorum. Those alternatives are set forth in Illinois v. Allen.
124
Allen was convicted of robbery by an Illinois jury. He petitioned for
a writ of habeas corpus in federal court claiming a wrongful deprivation
of his Sixth Amendment Constitutional right to remain present through-
out his trial. The federal court declined to issue the writ, but the Court
of Appeals reversed.' 25 The United States Supreme Court reversed the
Court of Appeals, holding that Allen's continuing disruptive and dis-
orderly conduct despite repeated warnings by the trial judge resulted in his
loss of the Constitutional right to be present throughout the trial. Further-
more, removing Allen from the courtroom and proceeding without him
until he promised to conduct himself properly was not unconstitutional.
Allen's misconduct began during voir dire examination of prospective
jurors. He argued with the judge in an abusive and disrespectful manner.
At one point, he stated to the judge, "when I go out for lunchtime, you're
[the judge] going to be a corpse here. ''126 He then tore up the file of his
Court-appointed attorney.
Justice Black wrote the majority opinion. The decision that Allen had
lost his right to be present in the courtroom was carefully qualified with
the reservation that a defendant can reclaim the right as soon as he is
willing to conduct himself consistently with judicial decorum and respect.
The majority of the Court proposed three far-reaching "constitu-
tionally permissible ways for a trial judge to handle an obstreperous
defendant like Allen: (1) bind and gag him, thereby keeping him present;
(2) cite him for contempt; (3) take him out of the courtroom until he
promises to conduct himself properly.' '127
The Court went on to say that no person should be tried while bound
and gagged "except as a last resort. ''128 The use of this alternative af-
fronts the dignity and decorum of judicial proceedings, and denies a de-
fendant of his privilege to communicate with his counsel. Yet, the Court
felt that "in some situations which we need not attempt to foresee, binding
'Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970).
'United States ex rel. Allen v. Illinois, 413 F.2d 232 (7th Cir. 1969).
"Allen, supra note 124 at 340.
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and gagging might possibly be the fairest and most reasonable way to
handle a defendant who acts as Allen did here. 129
The use of criminal contempt as a sanction could restore decorum
without resort to the alternative of binding and gagging. However, criminal
contempt as a sanction has limitations if a defendant desires to prevent
any trial of his case, or if his offense is so serious that a mere contempt
sentence presents no effective sanction. Possibly, civil contempt could be
used, thereby preserving the right to be present. But, a lengthy confine-
ment may result in the loss of adverse witnesses from which a defendant
could profit.
The majority of the Court did not hold that removing this defendant
from this own trial was the only solution of the problem. However, the
Court stated: "Deplorable as it is to remove a man from his own trial even
for a short time, we hold that the judge did not commit legal error in
doing what he did. "130
Justice Brennan concurred. He felt that a nation cannot endure if it
falls short on the "guarantees of liberty, justice and equality embodied
in our founding documents." The Constitutional right to remain present
during a trial must be considered in this context. Therefore, the govern-
mental prerogative to proceed with a trial, as opposed to the defendant's
right to be present, "may not be defeated by conduct of the accused that
prevents the trial from going forward."131
Justice Brennan would accord an unruly defendant adequate warning
that his conduct is intolerable as well as the possible consequences of con-
tinued misbehavior. He would also add that a trial court should make
reasonable efforts to enable an excluded defendant to communicate with
his attorney and to keep informed of the progress of the trial.
Justice Douglas agreed with the preservation of decorum in a crim-
inal trial However, he disagreed with the use of this case to establish
"guidelines for judicial control. 132 The record intimates that Allen was
a mental case, and with the passage of 13 years since the date of the
trial, the case should have been reversed for staleness of the record.
According to Justice Douglas,
What a judge should do with a defendant whose courtroom antics
may not be volitional is a perplexing problem which we should not
reach except on a clear record.m
Justice Douglas felt that the real problems were not present in this
case, but rather in two other strikingly different situations. First, the
political trial raises the question of "whether the accused has rights of
1Id.
'mid. at 347.





Montana Law Review, Vol. 32 [1971], Iss. 2, Art. 1
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol32/iss2/1
THE INCREASING USE
confrontation that the law invades at its peril.' 134 Second, trials may be
used by "minorities to destroy the existing constitutional system and
bring on repressive measures. "15 Justice Douglas would not propose any
guidelines for these 2 cases. He argued that the weighty problems pre-
sented by either situation should only be resolved when it reaches the
Court for review.
The result of the Allen case is justifiable on its facts. The trial judge
maintained his judicial serenity and dignity all throughout the proceed-
ings, at no time resorting to a "mudthrowing contest." He had several
choices to solve the problem, and the removal of Allen from the courtroom
allowed the trial to commence. If the trial had been delayed, great incon-
venience and expense would have resulted to judge, jurors, and counsel.
One man should never be allowed to upset the orderly processes of the
judicial system. In the words of the Court:
It would degrade our Country and our judicial system to permit
our courts to be bullied, insulted, and humiliated and their orderly
progress thwarted and obstructed by defendants brought before them
charged with crimes.'
Status of the law of Contempt in Montana
A vast majority of Montana attorneys who are admitted to practice in
the State courts are also admitted to practice in the Federal district
courts throughout the state.
All of the Supreme Court cases discussed previously in this article
are applicable to the federal courts in Montana. As a result, Montana
lawyers admitted to federal practice are subject to the possibility of
criminal or civil contempt sanction. There has been very little use of
the contempt power by Montana federal judges to the present time. How-
ever, various changes in the legal field may possibly cause an increase in
use of the contempt power, and an increase in the severity of punishment.
The possibility is not too remote that Montana may experience in the
future a "political" trial such as the Chicago-Seven Trial with the over-
tones of disrespectful and disorderly conduct on the part of the defendants.
The very nature of a political trial may present a dilemma for the attorney.
He must present his client with zeal within the bounds of law and ethics.
Yet, that zeal may seemingly place him in a position which conflicts with
his duty as an officer of the court. In other words, the cause that the at-
torney is representing may be distasteful to judge and jury thereby creat-
ing an impression that the attorney is disrespectful to the judiciary. Still,
the attorney must provide his client with adequate representation Which
includes all available defenses. Certainly, this representation should not
foster abusive and vile language, nor disrespect and disruption of the
'AId. at 353.
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judicial system. It is doubtful whether many Montana lawyers would
place themselves in such a position, except in rare situations. Montana
communities within which lawyers practice are small. Local public em-
barrassment as well as constant appearance before a limited number of
state and federal judges promotes self-restraint and reflection.
However, as a political trial becomes national in focus, lawyers with
national renown will be called into the state to participate in the defense.
Their special knowledge and ability in this field should secure an adequate
defense. But, there will be less reason for the self-restraint that could be
expected of a local attorney, since this trial in the local courts would be a
one-time event, and local public embarrassment would be short-lived. As a
result, the contempt power could become as widely used as it was by Judge
Hoffman in thL Chicago-Seven trial.
An increase in the use of contempt power could appear in other areas
of litigation directly affecting Montana lawyers. Automobile and other
accident cases continue to flourish, and jury awards have correspondingly
increased. Moreover, the products liability field of civil law has completely
over-reached the accident cases in significance and potential recovery. The
million dollar recovery has become a reality rather than a rarity. As a
result, products liability trials will become increasingly heated controver-
sies. Since these trials usually involve an individual who brings suit against
a foreign corporation, federal jurisdiction will be involved, and with it
comes the potential of contempt sanction.
If the jurisdiction of a case lies in one of the judicial districts in the
State court system, the extent of contempt sanction is much more limited
than in the federal system. The State judges are restricted to imposing
sentences not in excess of $500 or five days, or both in criminal contempt
cases.137 Of course, civil contempt procedures are also provided by statute
and recognized as inherent in the courts of record.
138
Our changing times may call for changes in the judicial approach of
maintaining order and decorum during the resolution of social problems.
An increase in the monetary value of civil suits, environmental control,
political trials and criminal cases such as the Manson trial in California
are among some of the considerations for the Montana lawyer and judic-
iary in the future.
CONCLUSION
The potential for the use and the abuse of the contempt power is un-
limited. Nevertheless, it is absolutely essential to our judicial system, and
should not be so diluted that it can no longer be used to preserve decorum
mREVISED CODES or MONTANA, § 93-9810 (1947) [hereinafter cited as R.C.M. 1947].
I-R.C.M. 1947, § 93-9811; Territory v. Murray, 7 Mont. 251, 15 P. 145 (1887). Mon-
tana also distinguishes between direct and indirect contempts. Summary punishment
of direct contempt is provided in R.C.M. 1947, § 93-9803. The procedure for indirect
contempt is found in R.C.M. 1947, §§ 93-9803, -9804, and -9809.
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and to facilitate the smooth flow of the administration of justice. However,
some safeguards must be provided for lawyers and their clients, especially
when charged with criminal contempt.
At present, the Supreme Court requires a jury trial for criminal
contempt sentences in excess of six months in federal district courts. How-
ever limited that restriction may seem, the Court further extends the
power to allow the district courts to place offenders on probation up to
five years. 139 The total time an offender may be within the control of the
court is 5 and one-half years. Furthermore, the court now allows the dis-
trict court during the trial the power to eject a defendant from the court-
room until he promises to behave, or to keep him in the courtroom after
binding and gagging him.
140
The Supreme Court requires a jury trial for criminal contempt sen-
tences in excess of 2 years in State courts.14' That limitation may be
further restricted depending on the individual State's ordinary criminal
sentencing statutes, or their criminal contempt sentencing statutes. How-
ever, States with no statutory limitations on criminal contempt sentencing,
and unclear sentencing provisions under their ordinary criminal statutes,
may have difficulty in applying the Supreme Court's rationale.
Today, there has been a great advance in labor unrest, civil rights
demonstrations, communist agitation, and racial disruptions. Many con-
servative people, and even some liberals, have difficulty tolerating such
movements. Sometimes, the conservative, or the liberal, who cannot tolerate
an unpopular cause, is a judge.
When judge and lawyer become entangled in a heated dispute over
some unpopular cause, and the lawyer becomes too persistent in advancing
his client's cause through his zeal as an advocate, the lawyer may find
himself faced with a prison sentence for criminal contempt. However, on a
given occasion the judge may become embroiled in the controversy to such
an extent that his personal bias toward the unpopular cause manifests
itself in his disposition of justice during the case. The lawyer is the only
one who is subject to the sanction of contempt. The judge, although par-
tially or even equally at fault for the disruption to the orderly administra-
tion of justice, can neither be held in contempt and imprisoned nor be
placed on probation for 5 years.
Of course, the courtroom must not be turned into a mockery of the
judicial system, and the lawyer must exercise all possible self-restraint to
avoid being offensive to the court. Insolent language and tactics on the
part of the lawyer cannot be tolerated. However, he should be accorded
every opportunity to advance his client's cause or to present his defense
within the bounds of the law and the Canons of Ethics.
'Frank, supra note 115.
110Illinois v. Allen, supra note 124.
1"Bloom, supra note 109.
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The conduct of the defendants in the Chicago Conspiracy Trial was
hardly respectful. Other means were available for the lawyers and their
clients to receive justice in a court of law. The judge exercised the con-
tempt power extensively, and, without a transcript or a report of the
case, it is difficult to comment on the propriety of his actions. However,
it is inexcusable for a lawyer and his clients to shout abusive language
at a judge because of his rulings. If the rulings are unfair, or prejudicial,
it is a simple matter to preserve the record for an appeal. A properly
functioning judicial system will afford a reversal and a new trial. Then,
disqualification of the judge would further assure a fair trial.
It devolves upon the attorney to assure decorum in the courtroom.
At all times, he should be respectful toward the judge, jury, and opposing
counsel. If his client disrupts the functioning of the system, he must
caution him against further disturbance. Judges are human and should
not be required to withstand a constant barrage of personal attacks, mis-
conduct, and disrespect. In the words of Justice Black in Illinois v. Allen,
It would degrade our Country and our judicial system to permit
our courts to be bullied, insulted, and humiliated and their orderly
progress thwarted and obstructed by defendants brought before them
charged with crimes."
The government's right to proceed against individuals charged with
crime must be balanced against arbitrary governmental power. On a rare
occasion, a judge may unjustly impose a contempt sentence, or impose a
sentence which is too lengthy. Certainly, governments and judges must
live by the rules even when challenged by rebels who refuse to do so. But,
the United States Supreme Court has provided an important safeguard
in the form of a jury trial.
A jury trial adds a democratic element to the law of contempt. It
takes away from one man the power to punish another summarily. It also
removes the power to control another's life for many years. Of course,
the power of contempt will still be available, and those who should be
charged with contempt will not be turned away without receiving a just
penalty. They will still be charged, but will be tried by a jury of peers-
twelve men instead of one.
The judge should always be assured of the use of civil contempt.
Therefore, the distinction between civil and criminal contempt should
be preserved. Civil contempt serves an altogether different purpose from
criminal contempt. It is used to coerce and compel compliance. No jury
trial should be accorded, because the contemnor holds the keys to his own
freedom through compliance with the provisions of the civil contempt.
Criminal contempt is used as a form of punishment, whether to pre-
serve decorum or to facilitate the smooth flow of justice. The contempt
must be classified as serious rather than petty before the right to a jury
',-Illinois v. Allen, supra note 124 at 346.
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trial attaches. A recurring opinion throughout the dissents in the Supreme
Court cases is that the serious-petty distinction is too difficult to deter-
mine. Therefore, a jury trial should extend to all criminal contempts.
Although the Supreme Court guidelines for determining the distinction
between serious and petty offenses are rather nebulous and somewhat
unworkable, they do provide a safeguard for a contemnor. If there were
no distinction, and a jury trial extended to all criminal contempts, the
jury would decide the fate of all charged. If a determination of guilt
were made, the sentence would still have to be rendered. Since in most
states, the judge prescribes the length of the sentence, a diverse variety
of sentences could result.
At least under the present distinction, a six-month proscription
without a jury trial keeps within reason the length of the possible
sentence. A judge may be more prone to impose a six-month sentence tc
avoid the incorvenience and expense of a jury trial. Of course, there is
always the chance that a sentence exceeding six months would be rendered,
and a jury trip] required. But, if a jury concludes that the contemnor is
guilty, the maximum sentence would be limited to that originally rendered
by the judge.
The procedure adopted by Judge Hoffman in Chicago of segmenting
charges of contempt in counts and imposing sentences less than 6 months
for each count in order to avoid the jury trial requirement has not yet
been considered by the Supreme Court. Approval of his approach could
lead to incongruous results. The total number of years a contemnor could
receive from criminal contempt punishment without a jury trial might
exceed the maximum punishment possible for the offense charged.
The Supreme Court will likely require a jury trial in the Chicago-
Seven criminal contempt cases for the portion of the total of the sentences
exceeding six months regardless of the isolation of the counts This con-
clusion is based on the trend of the law extending the jury trial safeguard,
and the three alternatives that were made available to a judge in Illinois
v. Allen. Thest defendants apparently obstructed justice, and were dis-
respectful to the judge. But, the possibility for abuse of the contempt
power in other cases such as this could be too great if the Court were to
accept the procedure adopted without according some safeguard. Rather
than permit the imposition of sentences far in excess of any other pre-
viously render-.d, the Court should extend its rationale in Cheff v. Schnack-
enberg and Bloom v. Illinois to these contempt cases.
It is possible the Court will look at each incident of contempt, and
uphold Judge Hoffman's procedure under the facts of the case. The
abuse given the judge by both the defendants and their lawyers may out-
weigh the jury trial safeguard, especially when the contemptuous con-
duct was so repeated and continuous as to amount to nearly 4 years in
total sentences. Yet, the approach adopted by the judge in Illinois v. Allen
would seem preferable, since the Chicago trial could have been delayed,
the defendants could have been removed from court or bound and gagged
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and kept with the court. Furthermore, the lawyers could either have been
removed from the defense of the case for breach of their duty as officers
of the court, or confined to prison through civil contempt until they were
willing to maintain decorum and respect.
The greatest difficulty with the present state of the law of contempt
is the decision of Frank v. United States.143 Under that decision, the judge
may suspend a sentence for criminal contempt. and place the offender on
probation for five years. If the conditions of probation are violated, the
offender could receive a sentence of six months without a jury trial.
However, the conditions of the local county jail could certainly make a
six-month sentence appear to be an eternity.
The Frank case is an anomaly in the law of contempt. It provides
too much control over an individual by one judge. The individual may
be subjected to the same conditions of probation as would a felony offender,
but the felony offender may secure a jury trial whereas the contemnor may
be dealt with summarily. Therefore, the only solution to the present status
of the law is to extend the right to a jury trial to all criminal contempts.
"3Frank, supra note 115.
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